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Governmentality and profi t extraction through 
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Abstract: As a result of the fi nancialization of household and national economies, 
indebtedness has become a system of domination shaping the making of contem-
porary subjects. Th is sort of governmentality through debt is a multifaceted phe-
nomenon aff ecting people’s economic and political behavior in both the North and 
the South. Disguised and legitimized by the moral obligation to repay debts, and 
by promises of upward social mobility (for the working classes in the North) and 
of development (for the population of the Global South), indebtedness disciplines 
households and neutralizes political agency under fi nance capitalism, as our eth-
nographic examples on the mortgage crisis in Spain and on microfi nance in Peru 
reveal.
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Th is article is about debt and its eff ects on the 
indebted people and communities that are 
subject to it. Th e unprecedented global growth 
of the second half of the twentieth and early 
twenty-fi rst centuries was sustained, at a na-
tional but also a household level, by the slow 
but steadily increasing dependence on credit, 
or fi ctitious money. Th is continuous growth 
came always punctuated by occasional spo-
radic and localized debt crises in some part of 
the global economic system. Th ese crises were 
oft en attributed to local ineffi  ciencies (corrupt 
local elites, defi cient infrastructures, inadequate 
connection to regional and global markets) 
always found in underdeveloped countries—
nothing that a good structural adjustment plan, 
the market, or political pressure could not fi x 
(Bene ría 1989). It was not until the year 2008 
that an evident global debt crisis also ravaged 
most developed countries, calling into question 
both development narratives and the reliance 
on debt for economic growth.
At this point, the local manifestations of the 
impact of indebtedness on diff erent communi-
ties and social groups across the globe became 
apparent. Th ese impacts range from massive sui-
cide waves of indebted Indian farmers (Guerin 
2014) to the impossibility for US students over-
burdened by debt to choose their own jobs and 
be fi nancially self-suffi  cient (Ross 2014); from 
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the reemergence of multigenerational house-
holds in Spain as a result of massive home evic-
tions by mortgage default (Sabaté 2016) to pre-
cariousness taking over the environment and 
the life of the inhabitants of entire regions such 
as the Bay of Bengal (Bear 2015); from the dis-
mantlement of Egyptian traditional and resilient 
economic networks to replace them by unreli-
able microcredit that results in sudden dispos-
session (Elyachar 2005) to the demographic 
desertifi cation of parts of the rural United States 
due to farm confi scations (Dudley 2000).
Th is article explores the consequences of the 
spread of new forms of indebtedness brought 
about by the emergence of fi nancial capitalism 
during the past 40 years. During this period, 
massive fi nancialization processes (understood 
as the infusion of fi nancial logics, fi nancial in-
struments, and the temporalities of capital ac-
cumulation into mechanisms of exchange and 
value creation) have taken place (Aalbers 2008; 
Gagó 2015). Th is process, in which indebted-
ness plays a central role, has radically changed 
how subjects perceive themselves and relate 
to each other, to the market, and to the state 
(Lazzarato 2013, 2014; Marazzi 2011). Th e liter-
ature and the current ethnography suggest the 
“debt society” as the new form that “neoliberal 
society” is taking in the early twenty-fi rst cen-
tury. In other words, there are, of course, many 
types of debt, and there have been many types 
of debt across history. In turn, neoliberalism has 
taken many diff erent forms since its intellectual 
inception in the 1940s and its political imple-
mentation in the 1980s. But, nowadays, there is 
a particular form of indebted society that is the 
result of specifi c assemblages of policies, values, 
and habits and is becoming the new format of 
the “neoliberal society.”
With debt being a governing tool, the institu-
tions—states, corporations, fi nancial institutions, 
NGOs—that have jurisdiction over this debt 
have the power to reshape individuals’ iden-
tities, and their civil and political status. Th is 
reshaping of contemporary subjects, however, 
does not occur in a homogeneous manner: it is 
rather a highly stratifi ed, path-dependent pro-
cess. Th us, for example, in contrast to Maurizio 
Lazzarato’s account, we highlight the previous 
and longer experience of structural adjust-
ment policies in the Global South, resulting in 
a chronifi ed situation of fabricated scarcity. A 
chronic state of indebtedness is arguably not 
a historical novelty, particularly for those who 
have traditionally been forced to resort to credit 
to satisfy their most basic needs. What, then, is 
distinctive about contemporary debt? In con-
temporary debtor-creditor relations, the asym-
metry between the two actors is reinforced by 
the fact that the risk assumed by creditors is 
minimal. Also, in the era of fi nancialization, 
indebtedness involves actors and institutions 
at very diff erent scales, from the local to the 
global: while debtors continue to be rooted in 
their local realities and engaged in their strug-
gle to have their material needs satisfi ed, cred-
itors are well connected to global markets with 
many options to diversify or minimize risk. Th is 
extension and diversifi cation of scales makes 
debtor-creditor relations increasingly illegible 
for indebted subjects who lack technical knowl-
edge, and to whom access is denied to crucial 
information about the very nature of their debt 
and the interests involved in it.
Th us, we suggest debt in the era of fi nancial-
ization is something new, strange, and distinct. 
Th e contemporary debt paradigm has gener-
ated its own form of subjectivation and identity 
construction, a governmentality of sorts, in the 
Foucauldian sense (García Lamarca and Kaika 
2016; Langley 2009). Such debt is, from an eco-
nomic perspective, a form of profi t extraction, 
of fi nancial expropriation (Lapavitsas 2009). It 
is entangled with particular assumptions about 
economic and ecological abundance, where debt 
and credit are depicted as relentlessly expand-
ing the space for commercial operations to play 
out, generating new sites for market exchange 
and resource consumption. From a political 
perspective, debt is a technology of power: it 
consists of a particular form of governmentality, 
aiming at the disciplining of subjects through 
indebtedness and through the promise of credit, 
profi t, abundance—and, in the event of insol-
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vency, the persistent threat of punishment. Th e 
moral obligation to repay debts is thus rein-
forced by additional means (bureaucratic, legal, 
fi nancial) that increase the pressure on debtors.
Th rough the analysis of ethnographic ac-
counts from Spain and Peru, we argue that the 
global debt society, made of indebted citizens 
who are increasingly subject to the dynamics 
of fi nance, is an emergent reality (Soederberg 
2014). We suggest today’s debt works as a global 
tool of governance with fundamental conse-
quences for how national governments, local 
authorities, private businesses and other gov-
erning entities, families, and individuals behave 
from an economic perspective, craft  their eco-
nomic lives, understand their social positions, 
and construct their own identities. Th e “indebted 
man” (Lazzarato 2012), thus, is a category of 
human being who perceives itself at a fault, per-
manently trying to repay what in many cases 
cannot be repaid, inherently guilty as they are 
in default. Consequently, the social and political 
rights gained throughout the twentieth century 
are now made conditional to their ability to re-
pay debts.
Th eorizing debt by 
historicizing fi nancial crisis
Forty years ago, capitalism started to slowly 
move away from a welfare state based on the 
Fordist pact into an era of hypermobile capital 
in which productive relocation/off shoring, cou-
pled with an increasingly deregulated fi nancial 
sector, planted the seeds for a new paradigm: 
global fi nancial capitalism. Th is neoliberal global 
fi nancial capitalism was supposed to sustain in-
defi nite global growth through generalized con-
sumerism (Baudrillard 1981; Lipovetsky 2006). 
Generalized consumerism, in one form or an-
other, becomes the unavoidable backbone of 
daily life. However, as salaries have not increased 
at the same speed as needs and wants, hyper-
consumerism cannot be sustained without mas-
sive personal and collective indebtedness (Ross 
2014).
Since 2008, attempts to conceptualize debt 
and its consequences have settled squarely in the 
mainstream spotlight, calling for and receiving 
abundant attention from society at large, policy 
makers, and researchers alike. Critical scholars 
have focused on understanding the impact that 
massive fi nancialization has had on our societies 
and social relationships, a process that manifests 
itself, among other symptoms, in the translation 
of debts into exchangeable fi nancial instruments 
(Gregory 2012; Weiss 2014). Th e goal of this lit-
erature is to understand how a society changes 
when most of its members are in some kind of 
debt. How is this process framed in the history 
of capitalism? How, in an extremely fi nancial-
ized society, is profi t made? How do politicians 
deal with the ubiquity of debt? How are these 
mechanisms changing the nature of the rela-
tionships among individuals, and between in-
dividuals and the state? How is the creation of 
citizens and subjects altered by the fi nancializa-
tion of social life?
To answer these questions, it is important to 
highlight that the 2008 “crisis” and its aft ermath 
was no historical anomaly. Th e ubiquity of debt 
and social exclusion did not start then. On the 
contrary, since the 1980s, many had been is-
suing early warnings about what was about to 
strike the, until then, seemingly well-protected 
economies of the global core. Social scientists, 
here and there, had already been examining 
economic lives in places that had been swept 
by previous, smaller-scale crises brought about 
by fi nancialization. Th e pervasive and periodic 
economic crises that have popped up across the 
world in the past 30 years were not isolated in-
cidents that should be exclusively blamed on 
context dependent ineffi  ciencies. Instead, these 
crises refl ected structural rearrangements of a 
global economic system within which the ex-
traction of profi t is based on debt and debt man-
agement, on the hypermobility and overuse of 
fi ctitious capital. Debt has become a governance 
as much as a profi teering tool. National debt, 
for instance, translates on defi cit-zero goals, re-
shaping of pension benefi ts, or tax increases. 
Aft er all, there is a characteristic genealogy that 
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unequivocally connects the many African socio-
economic collapses that followed the imposi-
tion of Bretton Woods–type structural adjust-
ment programs (Nigeria, Madagascar, Tanzania, 
Ivory Coast, and many others), the Mexican de-
valuations of 1982 and 1994, the Argentinian 
corralitos of 1989 and 2001, Peru in its hyper-
infl ated 1980s and its 1990s neoliberal “shock” 
therapy, Venezuela of 1994, the Dominican Re-
public of 2003–2004, the Japanese paralysis of 
the 1990s, the Asian stock market crash of 1997, 
the Russian fi nancial crisis of 1998, the dot-com 
crash of 1999–2003, the stock market downturn 
of 2002, the Chinese bubble of 2007, and the 
insurance and real estate crises that, starting in 
2008, changed the Western world and are still 
consuming the public and private resources of 
Greek, Portuguese, Spanish, US, and German 
citizens and states.
Th is is just a selection of the dozens of na-
tional crises that have reshaped states’ policies 
and people’s lives across the world in the past 
30 years. Despite the impressive variety of debt 
forms they include, they do share some funda-
mental commonalities: (1) they are the result 
of the implementation of the neoliberal dereg-
ulating economic recipe that endorsed and fa-
cilitated debt creation and circulation, a scheme 
devised by the Chicago School in the 1950s that 
started to be implemented in the real world 
by the Th atcher government in Great Britain 
(1979–1990) and the Reagan administration in 
the United States (1981–1989); (2) they stem 
from failed predictions of and clear deceptions 
about present and future wealth (what we call 
“fabricated abundance”) that translated on the 
inability to repay the debt generated by these 
profi t expectations; and (3) the recipe to solve 
each of these economically devastating events, 
this sudden scarcity, as fi ctitious as the previous 
abundance, was the implementation of neolib-
eral austerity programs. According to this recipe, 
the crisis, the sudden scarcity, must be addressed 
by imposing public austerity where state-pro-
vided welfare had existed before. We talk about 
fi ctitious scarcity because even though it is used 
to justify draconian cuts on social programs 
and benefi ts, there seems to be no problem to 
fi nd money to pay military expenditures, poli-
ticians’ salaries, or to bail out banks in trouble 
siphoning tax money to shareholders. Austerity 
programs tend to entail the scaling down of the 
welfare state through the reduction of public 
social services, privatization of state resources, 
redesign of labor regulations resulting in struc-
tural unemployment that allows a drastic reduc-
tion of wages, and tax increases on wages while 
tax cuts are implemented on large fortunes.
All types of debt, ultimately, result in a sin-
gular consequence, the emergence of “the in-
debted man” (Lazzarato 2012): a citizen that, via 
their own debts, via the taxes implemented on 
him/her to deal with the state’s commitments 
with international public institutions or private 
fi rms, and via having to pay for services previ-
ously covered by the welfare state, is defi ned by 
the single truth that his/her current and future 
labor will be mostly devoted to pay for money 
he or she never saw. Th erefore, all these forms 
of debt collection—direct or indirect (through 
taxes)—converge and extract the diminishing 
wages and savings of workers. Ordinary citizens 
are governed on behalf of the overwhelming 
weight carried by the idea of debt, attached to 
negative moral implications.
We are witnessing the emergence of an al-
legedly nonideological governance based on 
debt repayment obligations. Th e conservative 
and social-democratic parties that have alter-
natively ruled the majority of Europe during 
the past 50 years off er the same solution to the 
contemporary crisis: employment deregula-
tion, lower wages, and public services cuts. Th is 
recipe for austerity (as a response to alleged 
fi nancial scarcity) achieved the status of un-
questionable dogma during the fi rst fi ve years 
of the current crisis. In Europe, any country 
questioning that dogma was threatened with 
the arrival of the Brussels men in black. Iron-
ically, European countries are receiving from 
the troika the same kind of discipline many 
countries from the Global South received from 
the Bretton Woods institutional complex some 
decades before.
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Th e atmosphere of euphoria experienced 
during economic booms inadvertently contrib-
utes to set the basis for the pressures toward 
indebtedness on the microscale of households 
and individuals. For wide strata of the work-
ing and middle classes, applying for credit is a 
logical, naturalized entailment of their commit-
ment to advancement, progress, and upward 
social mobility. Consumption through credit 
is seen as a way to overcome a previous situa-
tion of exclusion and to engage with emulation 
practices, as has been the case for black middle 
classes in post-apartheid South Africa (James 
2014), for population sectors who have been 
traditionally barred from home ownership in 
the United States (Reid 2010), and for migrants 
who arrived in Spain during the recent building 
boom (Suárez 2014). As the hope for increased 
material well-being is entangled with social 
identities and forms of belonging, intergenera-
tional legacies, and reciprocity, indebtedness is 
also a means to forge and cement obligations 
that strengthen social bonds, such as the ones 
at play when parents support children in access-
ing homeownership, as has been a widespread 
practice in Spain. Because no gift  comes without 
strings attached, any debt is in itself a social re-
lation that comes with a more or less stringent 
reciprocity clause (a moral obligation), and it 
reshapes the identities of both the giver and the 
recipient, who then remain attached to each 
other (Mauss 1990).
Moreover, individual incentives for con-
sumer debt can also be identifi ed in particular 
behaviors that, in some sense, entail spending 
beyond one’s means, relying on future income. 
Th is can be noted in the quest for psychological 
well-being through compulsive consumption, a 
behavior that is oft en rationalized as self-com-
pensation for eff orts and exploitation endured in 
the arena of production. Credit-borrowing prac-
tices are also key to addressing everyday econo-
mies in settings and social sectors where scarcity 
is experienced on a daily basis by most of the 
population. Th at is the case, for instance, in the 
Mexican rural economies described by Magda-
lena Villarreal (2008), where locals are forced to 
buy on credit the most basic goods while expect-
ing to obtain their income at the end of the week, 
or in Matthew Desmond’s (2016) account of 
poverty and precariousness in US cities, where 
the products of “fringe fi nance” (Ross 2014) or 
the “poverty industry” (Soederberg 2014), such 
as payday loans, are among the few resources 
available for the poor to make ends meet.
Th e emerging global debt society, as an out-
come of this debt regime, depends on manufac-
turing ephemeral abundance during economic 
booms. Th e availability of credit is then con-
structed as a seemingly permanent abundance 
and a source of personal empowerment that fos-
ters progress and endless growth, and indebted-
ness is promoted by means of aggressive lending 
practices and specifi c fi nancial products target-
ing diff erent categories of customers. During 
such phases, the debt economy/society is also the 
result of the failed consolidation of the Fordist 
promise, supposedly consisting of redistribution 
and the access to a culture of consumption that 
cannot be sustained by the actual wages paid to 
workers. Th e crisis brought about the imposition 
of austerity, legitimized by blame and uncer-
tainty. Th e structural violence exerted by debt on 
people and their livelihoods is unveiled at that 
point through expropriation and foreclosures 
(Jeff erson 2013; Martin and Niedt 2015).
A comprehensive account of the economic, 
political, and social dimensions of debt shows 
how the accumulation of fi nancial capital keeps 
reproducing itself and its indebted subjects, in 
situations of both prosperity and crisis (Piketty 
2014). Th is negates the common-sense assump-
tion that it is during prosperity when capitalism 
seems to work, and then overaccumulation cri-
ses prove its failure. In moments of profound 
economic upheaval like that of 2008, the work-
ings of capital accumulation are not reconsid-
ered but consolidated.
Ethnographies of indebtedness
Debt and credit relations, as well as the implica-
tions of indebtedness for the distribution of re-
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sources and for the reshaping of social structure 
and power relations at several scales, including 
the household, the fi rm, and the state, have not 
only been the object of theoretical refl ection. 
Several ethnographers have also recently iden-
tifi ed indebtedness as a key means of under-
standing people’s living conditions, concerns, 
and struggles under contemporary capitalism: 
among those are Daniel Knight’s (2015) account 
of the Greek experience of the current eco-
nomic crisis, and Clara Han’s (2012) description 
of moral and economic debts in a poor neigh-
borhood of post-Pinochet Chile.
Beyond the objective features of debt and 
credit relations, ethnography allows us to ad-
dress their ambiguity as they shape the lived 
experience of debtors, especially with respect to 
moral valuation. On the one hand, as long as it 
remains a source of abundant capital, assets, and 
other forms of access to circuits of commerce 
at multiple scales, credit may be experienced as 
a promise of independence and improvement 
for indebted subjects, an empowerment tool: 
the “American dream.” According to this so-
called dream, individuals are constituted as self-
regulating and self-suffi  cient entrepreneurs or 
investors who are seen to become empowered 
by boldly assuming risks in their economic de-
cisions and who thus reject dependency on state 
subsidies or on humanitarian aid. Th at is the case 
for mortgage borrowers in Western countries 
who base their decision to purchase a home as 
a way to accumulate assets for the future in the 
context of the rollback of public welfare (Maurer 
1999). It is also the case for microfi nance clients 
in the Global South, for whom microcredit is 
presented as an opportunity for entrepreneur-
ial empowerment, as an all-purpose economic 
and ethical silver bullet that fi ghts poverty and 
underdevelopment’s vices and evils, such as 
those stereotypically seen to inhere in abusive 
husbands, broken families, and disempowered 
political constituents (Elyachar 2002).
On the other hand, especially during eco-
nomic crisis where fabricated abundance is re-
placed by fabricated scarcity, debt can also be 
experienced as a factor of dependence, power-
lessness, and subordination. As debtors are con-
fronted with the threat of default as a result of 
overindebtedness and fi nancial distress, the role 
of debts as generators of exclusion and inequal-
ity is unveiled. Debt is also a powerful incentive 
to motivate people to work for less, to eff ectively 
deregulate the labor market.
In both kinds of scenarios, debt crises are 
followed by an intensifi cation of discourses em-
phasizing the moral and legal obligation to re-
pay (Graeber 2011), which paves the way for 
the legitimation of neoliberal political measures 
such as structural adjustment and austerity . Also 
at the level of individuals and households, pres-
sure is exerted so that debtors prioritize their fi -
nancial commitments over other pressing needs 
and continue to observe the rigid stipulation of 
debt repayments despite the changing contexts 
brought about by unemployment, illness, and 
other adverse circumstances. Th is strong-arm 
imposition of neoliberal policies results in the 
transgression of moral economy principles that 
used to govern debt and credit relations as they 
were practiced in noncapitalist or pre-neoliberal 
contexts (Guyer 2012) and whose fragility was 
not perceived so blatantly in past, more pros-
perous years.
Frontier subjects: Microfi nance 
at Peru’s “last corners”
Th e 20 villages of Peru’s Caylloma Province 
occupy a zone of sharp peaks, craggy slopes, 
and winding unpaved mountain roads in the 
Southern Andes. Th is geography was once a 
forbidding frontier, even with Arequipa, Peru’s 
sprawling second city, only about 150 kilome-
ters away. Starting in 1985, a national nongov-
ernmental organization called DESCO (Center 
for Studies and Promotion of Development) 
saw these rural highland communities as an im-
poverished frontier space into which national 
markets had yet to penetrate. Th ey sought to 
integrate these rural highland communities into 
the broader national economy. DESCO, and a 
growing group of organizations that arrived in 
its wake, found the most feasible way to do this 
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was by creating a credit economy and, with it, a 
new class of indebted subjects.
Th e NGO would connect Caylloma to the 
rest of Peru through debt. DESCO brought mi-
crofi nance to the region an essential aspect of its 
conquest of geography. It laid the groundwork 
for what has become, today, a thriving credit/
debt economy. In 1994, DESCO helped establish 
the Colca Valley’s fi rst and still most prominent 
microcredit institution, the NGO Fondesurco 
(Southern Regional Fund). Since then, a fl urry 
of other microfi nance NGOs and credit coop-
eratives have entered the bustling streets and 
alleyways of Chivay, Caylloma’s provincial capi-
tal, animating the busy market town with a new 
fl ock of knowledge workers, fi nancial entrepre-
neurs, and employment opportunities.
Fondesurco’s mission statement suggests an 
eff ort to extend the fi nancial frontier: accord-
ing to the 2014 version of its website, it seeks to 
“achieve social inclusion, for which [the orga-
nization] prioritizes access to credit for people 
excluded from the fi nancial system, for people 
that live in conditions of poverty” (see Fonde-
surco 2019). One 2014 promotional post on its 
website titled “Fonddesurco: First in Financial 
Inclusion” indicated that the NGO prides itself 
in “taking microcredit to those areas where be-
fore, nobody would dare go,” repeatedly refer-
ring to Peru’s “most obscure places.” Th e staff  
interviewed at Fondesurco would use similar 
phrases evocative of the frontier discourse that 
accompanies the expanding credit/debt econ-
omy, referring to their ability to access the últi-
mas esquinas, or “last corners,” of Peru, with 
the Spanish word última, like the English “last,” 
evoking distance in both space and time. Th is 
creates a certain category of moral subject in the 
Colca Valley: residents of that “most obscure 
place” are framed as not only unbanked but also 
ungoverned, morally incomplete, not self-real-
ized as inherently entrepreneurial, and lacking 
the economic knowledge to render themselves 
truly independent (Elyachar 2002; Roy 2010).
Today, taking out a small credit, and going 
into what institutions see as manageable amounts 
of debt, is widely presented as economic com-
mon sense, a default move for anyone interested 
in advancing their economic situation anywhere 
in the world. In Peru’s Andes, credit is frequently 
posed as a strategy that stands in contradiction 
to seeking handouts from the government in a 
way that legitimates the state’s thin presence as a 
support for local safety nets. Colca’s municipal 
budgets are otherwise extremely stressed; may-
ors are engaged in a constant eff ort to secure 
competitive government agency and foundation 
funding for local projects. Given the palpable 
absence of the state in Colca’s villages, DESCO 
staff  would make their rounds through village 
meetings and civil society events, arguing that 
all people should be taking out credit as a rule. 
Th us, just as the institutional and conceptual 
infrastructures of neoliberal credit/debt was a 
means of taming a rugged geography, and of 
pulling Peru’s residents into national circuits 
of commerce and asset exchange, indebtedness 
also became a form of governance, a means of 
disciplining these ideal subjects of development.
Th is neoliberalizing frontier ideology en-
gaged NGOs like DESCO to justify the state’s 
relative absence by framing all Cayllominos as 
potential entrepreneurs who did not need gov-
ernment support to become economic agents. 
Th e key problem of development was not framed 
as poverty due to broader histories of uneven 
development and expropriation. Rather, from 
credit-supplying and credit-promoting NGOs, 
development’s principal challenge was one of 
untapped potential: some villagers, according 
to this framework, did not realize their entre-
preneurial spirit was locked within themselves. 
With a small amount of fi nancial help, they 
could tap into that potential for cultivating their 
own human capital, creating additional jobs, and 
contributing to the rural economy.
Th e frontier discourse of microfi nance, and 
the fi nancialized (read: indebted) entrepreneur-
ial subjects it creates, is rooted in an institution-
ally supported desire to render indebtedness a 
total social fact, promoting and expanding it to 
the point of becoming ubiquitous in daily social 
life. As debt becomes a total social fact through 
the abundance of credit, independent and in-
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debted entrepreneurs serve both to justify the 
state’s absence and to create profi t and legitima-
tion for the region’s burgeoning rural microfi -
nance institutions.
Do these institutions simply seek to exploit 
and deprive rural people? Microfi nance cer-
tainly consolidates the fundamental structures 
of a market-driven economy in which neoliberal 
states like Peru exchange what were once their 
welfare obligations for a form of subject-making 
in which they instead can only be expected to 
provide the basic, bare-bones conditions for 
people in need to rescue themselves through the 
magic of entrepreneurship. However, we must 
also see microfi nance as many Colcans do: it is 
an ambiguous, and not entirely sinister, process. 
Th e intentions behind microfi nance were not 
only to spread capitalism in a place where the 
state was absent but also to democratize capital-
ism’s emancipatory potentials, as made famously 
clear by Muhammad Yunus and his Grameen 
Bank, the inventors of microfi nance (Roy 2010).
On the ground in Caylloma, if DESCO 
branded the credit economy as a relatively sim-
ple means of achieving economic integration, 
then credit and debt were also explicitly framed 
as a response to the specter of the government 
handout and the stereotypically dependent An-
dean villager. Th e 1990s government’s largesse 
at community and individual levels (from build-
ing schools to distributing bags of rice), accord-
ing to the story many staff  members of DESCO, 
Fondesurco, and other microfi nance projects 
would tell, resulted in the creation of a mass of 
dependent subjects who temporarily lost the 
ability to take care of themselves. Th is phenom-
enon is pejoratively labeled asistencialismo in 
Peru, which suggests a crippling impulse to 
sell out one’s vote, one’s independence, or one’s 
agency to the organization or political party that 
off ers the most in the way of easy gift s. Today, 
to call someone asistencialista is an insult by 
NGO workers referring to an allegedly chronic 
dependence on handouts. Th is syndrome of de-
pendence or assistance addiction is posited as 
the polar opposite of virtuous individualized 
and independent entrepreneurship.
Asistencialismo tells us something about the 
central place of the indebted subject in neolib-
eral development today. Th ese projects replace 
individual and household dependence on the 
state with a dependence on debt and a condition 
of indebtedness. Credit’s ability to discipline 
daily life at a capillary level is exemplifi ed by 
Rogelio Taco, a participant in one of DESCO’s 
youth entrepreneurship initiatives. A program 
success story that spoke positively of the in-
tervention, Rogelio’s description of the NGO’s 
regular surprise audit visits to the site of his 
guinea pig breeding enterprise displayed credit’s 
ability to remake ordinary subjectivity through 
discipline:
Honestly, [the surprise visits] are good. 
One doesn’t know when they will arrive, 
and they fi nd you, and it teaches you that 
you constantly have to be there with the 
project, and constantly with your busi-
ness; it’s not that you can hide. Because 
if [the NGO] says, we’re going to visit all 
your sites at this particular time, then you 
make it pretty for the one day and that’s it.
Th e promise of potential profi t, and thus the po-
tential ability to repay a debt, ideally rises to a 
continuous obsession that dominates the behav-
ior of participants in DESCO’s project. In other 
words, indebtedness is not only an economic 
condition but also an everyday sensibility.
A briefer negative comment captures a dis-
tinct dimension of the role of indebtedness in 
Colca’s daily routines. Gerardo Huaracha, an 
elderly entrepreneur and occasionally indebted 
client of Caylloma’s microcredit agencies who 
has lived in his Colca community for most of his 
long life, once tersely described a village land-
scape increasingly dominated by cement block 
homes instead of the more historic adobe: “Look 
at this place. All loans.” Th ere, he remarks on a 
speculative landscape of cookie-cutter homes 
funded by proliferating debt, placing it in his 
moral judgment as both aesthetically foreign and 
as symbols of a precariously fabricated abun-
dance. Colca’s new cement block homes show a 
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remarkable resemblance to the structures at the 
center of Spain’s mortgage crisis. Credit and debt 
are more than a way to become economically 
“empowered,” according to their booster NGOs 
and banks. Th ey are the only option. In this way, 
microfi nance is revealing of deep structures of 
indebtedness that connect the supposedly “em-
powered” subjects that are Caylloma Province’s 
aspiring entrepreneurs to Spain’s mortgaged 
subjects.
Mortgaged subjects in Spain
Th e self-identifi cation of middle- and working-
class people as debtors—some of them facing 
considerable hardship—has gained an unprec-
edented saliency over the last years of economic 
crisis in Spain. Th is has happened aft er a period 
of apparent prosperity, shaped by the housing 
and credit bubble that started in the 1980s and 
abruptly ended in 2007 (López and Rodríguez 
2010). During that period, indebtedness—due 
to mortgage loans, credit cards, or other fi nan-
cial products—was rarely seen as a burden or as 
a threat for domestic economies. Rather, there 
was considerable trust across social strata that 
prosperity would never be endangered. Possible 
sources of uncertainty were neglected: interest 
rates were expected not to increase, real estate 
prices were supposed to grow indefi nitely, the 
possibility to work overtime was thought to be 
always available, and temporary jobs—millions 
of them depending on the building sector—were 
erroneously perceived as stable. Th ese expecta-
tions, combined with the generalized belief that 
home ownership was the most advantageous 
form of housing tenancy (Allen et al. 2004)—a 
preference that, far from being the consequence 
of a Hispanic “culture of home ownership,” had 
been promoted by fi nancial institutions and 
real estate agents, as well as by fi scal policies, 
since the Francoist period (Naredo and Montiel 
2011; Palomera 2014)—resulted in a situation in 
which being indebted was a self-evident condi-
tion, and, as such, it did not have much weight 
for the confi guration of subjectivities and social 
identities. Under those circumstances, sacrifi ces 
made to repay mortgages—usually over 30- or 
40-year periods—were perceived as acceptable 
by people who aspired to all the perceived ad-
vantages of owner-occupation: home building, 
spatial attachment, a source of material well-
being, a guarantee for the future, and a gift  for 
the next generation.
Th e accessibility of mortgage loans, the build-
ing boom, and the intensifi cation of fi scal in-
centives had been reinforcing the tendency. 
Creditors aggressively off ered loans in diff erent 
market niches, targeting even the most vulnera-
ble sectors of society (Suárez 2014)—including 
several millions of migrants who were arriving 
at the country at the time, and for which the 
purchase of a home entailed a promise of social 
integration, despite the strong discrimination 
they had to cope with in the real estate mar-
ket (Martínez Veiga 1999). Even in situations 
where the high probability of insolvency was 
not so diffi  cult to forecast, loans were not de-
nied. High-risk lending, oft en including pred-
atory practices (Nasarre 2011), gave way to the 
emergence of a subprime market, where loans 
were off ered—at a high interest—despite the 
low chances of having them repaid. However, the 
economic breakdown experienced in the coun-
try since the advent of the crisis, with its dra-
matic impact on wide layers of the population, 
has unveiled a major social, economic, and po-
litical problem: generalized overindebtedness in 
a context of pervasive unemployment. Th e un-
sustainable burden of mortgage repayments has 
led to unprecedented rates of default and to a 
dramatic spate of home repossessions, aff ecting 
almost 740,000 properties from 2007 to the sec-
ond trimester of 2017 (CGPJ 2017).
During the fi eldwork we conducted in the 
metropolitan area of Barcelona between 2012 
and 2015, where the testimonies of a variety of 
actors involved in mortgage indebtedness were 
collected, the prospect of being forced to stop 
repaying a mortgage emerged as a milestone in 
debtors’ narratives. Th e moral strength of the 
obligation to repay debts and the suspicion that 
surrounds default accounts for the fear and 
shame entailed by such decisions. For many 
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mortgagors, stating their will to quit repay-
ments in front of a bank clerk entails an explicit 
renunciation of their former life project, which 
up to then had been turning around the access 
to home ownership. Th at was, for example, Nel-
son’s case: in his words, he felt “as if I were a 
youngster again,” as, 15 years aft er his arrival in 
Barcelona, and despite all his eff orts working as 
a bricklayer, he lost his fl at and was forced back 
to the tenant condition. In fact, debt refusal 
remains unthinkable for a period long aft er fi -
nancial distress has appeared. It is during that 
period when workers make enormous eff orts to 
keep their employment and any other sources 
of income, and to cut any other expenses—even 
the most basic ones—to be able to keep up with 
mortgage repayments. In so doing, they are ex-
posed to increased exploitation and uncertainty.
Once the loss of the property is assumed, pri-
orities are reorganized and attention is focused 
on survival and on the attainment of decent liv-
ing standards. A new struggle begins to get rid 
of the debt—as the Spanish mortgage law does 
not cancel it aft er the dwelling has been lost—
and to access an alternative shelter. Th is struggle 
is then highlighted in people’s discourses, once 
owner-occupation has been discarded as an 
aff ordable possibility. Th us, mortgage overin-
debtedness—sometimes leading to default—not 
only endangers livelihoods in a material sense, 
regarding the access to housing and the satisfac-
tion of other needs. It also constrains people’s 
life projects and their chances for social inclu-
sion, by subjecting them to the specifi c form 
of “government on life” imposed by perpetual, 
sometimes unsustainable indebtedness. Indeed, 
mortgagors oft en report their inability to plan 
or to decide on their lives even in the shortest 
term, as they are subject to the creditor’s will. As 
Esmeralda put it:
You give up planning your life. Th inking 
about tomorrow. Not even about next 
month. You cannot think; if you think 
about tomorrow, you go crazy. Th ere was 
a time when it seemed that a family had 
some scope for action: I do this or I do that; 
then, depending on how things evolved, 
we went on making decisions . . . It was 
reversible. But now there is no choice any 
more. Properties are so devalued that you 
have no choice. Because, if I knew my 
problem would be solved if I sold the fl at, 
I would rent another one elsewhere and 
that’s it. Or I would move in with my par-
ents-in-law. But the problem is that half 
the debt would still remain. I would fi nd 
myself with no properties, paying a rent 
and repaying the mortgage loan.
Th e bank’s actions depend on fi nancial factors, 
completely out of debtors’ control and oft en un-
derstanding, such as the management of bank 
mergers and takeovers; changes in legislation; 
policy variations among diff erent geographical 
areas; the disposition, availability, and work-
loads of public defenders; judges’ sentences set-
ting court precedent; the dynamics of local real 
estate markets, etcetera.
As the Spanish experience shows, fi nancial 
distress due to overindebtedness, irrespective of 
whether mortgagors eventually manage to avoid 
default, plays a crucial role in shaping people’s 
subjectivities as debtors and, therefore, as sub-
jects that are being forced to subordinate their 
chances of social reproduction to the workings 
of fi nance. Th e mortgage crisis in Spain has un-
veiled in a particularly salient manner the “rule 
of debt” that fi nancialization and the gener-
alization of credit borrowing to access basic 
resources has imposed on households under 
fi nance capitalism. Households fi nd themselves 
under the disciplining forces that not only have 
the power to infl uence and put pressure on their 
precarious domestic economies but also are ca-
pable of shaping social and cultural processes 
leading to the emergence of indebted subjects 
(Langley 2009).
During the early years of the crisis, the feel-
ings of shame and guilt attached to mortgage 
default contributed to the invisibility of default-
ing debtors. However, as time went by and the 
crisis became chronic, the spate of repossessions 
was increasingly visible, and a variety of reac-
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tions among the aff ected population and among 
society at large were provoked. People’s indig-
nation in the face of the transgression of moral 
economy principles (Sabaté 2016) gave way to 
attempts at collective organization among mort-
gage defaulters. Th e anti-repossession move-
ment Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca 
(Coalition of People Aff ected by Mortgages—
PAH), created in 2009 in Barcelona, is the most 
conspicuous example of such reactions. As one 
of its main goals, it has promoted an alternative 
narrative of the crisis (Colau and Alemany 2012) 
that questions the legitimacy of home repos-
sessions, basing their critique on the irrespon-
sibility—and even the illegality—of predatory 
lending practices, and on the disastrous social 
consequences entailed by the loss of the home 
and by lifelong indebtedness. Th e movement 
has succeeded in mobilizing and empowering a 
great variety of aff ected mortgagors and others 
who sympathize with them (Mir et al. 2013). 
Th rough diff erent actions of civil disobedience 
and protests against fi nancial institutions, it has 
gained broad support in civil society. Th e move-
ment’s ability to mobilize otherwise excluded 
groups around a common identity of victims 
of fraud, counteracting prior blaming processes 
and deconstructing their self-identifi cation as 
defaulting subjects, is especially salient. Th e 
PAH has greatly succeeded in turning many of 
its members into empowered social actors who 
are struggling to overcome its previous stigma 
and invisibility (García Lamarca 2017; Suárez 
2017). It remains to be seen whether it will have 
enough traction to “de-mortgage lives” (García 
Lamarca and Kaika 2016) by neutralizing the 
“rule of debt” on indebted subjects.
Conclusion
In the past 40 years, debt, in the framework 
of the massive fi nancialization of the world 
economy and of the household economies that 
compose it, has become an unavoidable factor 
of economic and political behavior and of the 
making of contemporary subjects. Debt is in-
deed a “total social fact.” Like Mauss’s gift , debt 
touches nearly every social institution—from 
reorganizing kinship structures to retooling 
forms of ritual to altering the way people un-
derstand their life projects to changing the way 
subjects imagine a polity.
Debt, however, is also much more. Its gener-
alization as a framework of modern economic 
life has contributed to its transformation into a 
system of political domination that constrains 
citizens’ behavior, as the vast majority of them 
are also debtors: governmentality through debt.
Th e ubiquity of debt and its de facto trans-
formation into a governance tool is a multifac-
eted phenomenon. Collective indebtedness is 
achieved in many diff erent ways. Households 
go into indebtedness when, perceiving a period 
of apparent stability and growth, they take on 
debts to obtain desirable goods and services 
that lie beyond the reach of their wages. Fami-
lies also go into indebtedness when the revenues 
generated by wages or investments (like the ones 
conducted in a phase of apparent abundance) 
decline or stop altogether, or when public fi scal 
pressure increases. In periods of economic con-
traction, both types of debt result in diff erent 
levels of state sanctioned violence over indebted 
households.
Th e tight regulation of contemporary debt 
and credit relations has subordinated debt in-
teractions to a technocratic jurisdiction that 
obscures the depth of its social and personal 
reach. As a result, the experience of the debtor 
is materially shaped by processes taking place 
at a very abstract level—that of global fi nancial 
markets—that are beyond not only the debtor’s 
control but also their perception and under-
standing. In this sense, the illegibility of debt 
and credit relations in the era of fi nancialization 
aggravates the powerlessness of debtors and 
serves as a legitimation for the creditor’s claim 
on all of the debtors’ resources, including not 
only what they actually have left  but also what 
they can manage to mobilize through their so-
cial networks—on the basis of moral obligation, 
as well as their potential future income—relying 
on their ability to sell their labor power.
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Our examination of two distinct ethno-
graphic settings provided in this article allows 
us to identify common trends across the North-
South divide. In both cases, debt spreads as a tool 
to materialize hope of a better future (homes in 
Spain, small-scale development in Peru). Th is 
tool, however, depends on the vagaries of inter-
national and regional markets without concerns 
for the local realities of its debtors. Th e result 
is a devastating level of unredeemable indebt-
edness that pushes households to situations of 
even higher dependence or marginalization than 
the pre-debt situation. Th is vulnerability makes 
political and economic subjects extremely mal-
leable, willing to work for less and with little 
or no political agency. Th e structural violence 
exerted on debtors is not always visible. It is 
only unveiled during crisis periods. But, at that 
time, it tends to be depicted as an inevitable 
anomaly, a catastrophe due to exceptional cir-
cumstances, rather than a systemic feature of 
fi nancial capitalism.
Th e ascendance of debt is achieved through 
highly eff ective discursive mechanisms. First, 
debt emerges as a seeming good because it is 
a means to “democratize” capitalism by mate-
rializing the promise of independence and im-
provement to all (through entrepreneurialism 
and consumption). It articulates the expectation 
of inclusion and upward mobility (for the poor 
in the North) or “development” through credit 
(for Southern countries). In this iteration, credit 
embodies the powerful trope of modernization 
and progress. And second, the credit-debt pair 
is established as a sacred relationship that em-
bodies the viability of society (and households) 
itself. If a country, or a household, has good 
credit, they will remain part of society. Other-
wise, the inability to return a credit questions 
that society’s entire moral schema. Debt, thus, 
is a fundamental obligation that generates de-
pendence and guilt, even as its boosters sug-
gest that credit—debt’s friendlier face—is the 
only form of true independence in a market 
economy. Debtors (particularly defaulters, or 
those at risk of entering default) are blamed for 
their irresponsibility in borrowing too much 
and for their inability to meet their fi nancial 
commitments.
Debt’s complete life cycle cannot be under-
stood without the succession of periods of fi cti-
tious abundance followed by periods of equally 
fabricated scarcity. Fictitious abundance ex-
presses itself as booms on profi t expectations, as 
it happens in urban real estate markets, where 
people are made to believe their ever-growing 
equity potential will indefi nitely cover what at 
the beginning is considered ephemeral debts. 
Fabricated scarcity emerges, for instance, when 
Spanish citizens are forced to pay their taxes to 
cover the losses three banks incurred as a result 
of their aggressive, high-risk lending practices. 
Th is sudden scarcity legitimizes the imposition 
of austerity measures and the disciplining not 
only of defaulters but also of the citizenry at 
large.
Nevertheless, this should not lead us to as-
sert a supposed homogeneity of all debt and 
all debtors. In both examples, inequalities and 
power relations intrinsic to capitalism are rein-
forced—and, to some extent, reshaped—by the 
violence exerted on subjects through debt. Sub-
jects in diff erent positions within the structure 
of capital step into indebtedness—and therefore 
acquire their subjectivity as debtors—in distinct 
conditions that, in turn, strongly shape their 
chances to be able to repay, to keep debt at a sus-
tainable level, or, if a less tenable fate is in order, 
to obtain debt relief or to secure their livelihood 
once they are in default. Th is is how, we con-
tend, debt and credit relations contribute to the 
reproduction of fi nancial capitalism on a global 
scale. All in all, debt is a globalization driver and 
indebted subjects are its fodder.
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